reflection (was: Fare's response on threads)
Lynn H. Maxson
lmaxson@pacbell.net
Tue, 19 Sep 2000 09:11:26 -0700 (PDT)
Jecel,
I'm sorry I couldn't resist responding with "my point exactly".<g>
With that facetious remark out of the way let's get to the more
serious discussion.
"But in a way, the program now "knows" where it was loaded in
memory and what resources it is using."
I would almost respond that to know is to know you know, itself a
reflective activity/process. The "in a way" is part of the
deceptive beauty of mimicry in that it leads us to engage
improperly and incorrectly in "transference". Reflection is a
particularly (though not exclusively) human ability. When we
engage in it we are "aware" that we are doing so. In fact it is
that awareness that "inspires" to define it, to give it a "word".
Everyone reading this knows that a computer, a system of hardware
and software, does not "know" what it is doing. It only does it.
It does it without knowing. To date we have found no means of
transferring our means of "knowing" to software except through
mimicry. HAL as depicted in "2001" is impossible. It's bad
enough when movies, books, press, TV, etc. engage in such flights
of fancy, but we are supposed to know better.
Mimicry is a form of simulation. Basically software simulates
what otherwise would be a manual human activity. Moreover it
simulates only repetitive "clerical" activities which we "know"
how to translate into the instuction set of a computer. That says
that we know there are things we don't know, again something not
possible to "transfer" (currently) into software.
As long as we acknowledge that reflection (or reflexive
programming) is based on mimicry I don't have a problem. It isn't
something that the software "knows" it is doing. It is simply
something that it does, moreover that it was told to do. Mimic
behavior then in software must be "externally" imposed, written,
directed, or otherwise humanly expressed (directly or indirectly).
Reflexive programming then occurs through deliberate insertion of
an human author. To assert then that the "system" does this or
that means that some human author has directed it to do so. In my
particular project in which a single language is used throughout
(not because it is necessary or better but only that it is
possible) I must insure the transition exists from my level of
assertion throughout all lower levels. In short I cannot assume
that the "system" will do anything without having first "told" it
to do so. The telling of the first part must meld into that of
the second: they must exist as a whole concurrently.
I do not have then the "convenience" of higher level abstractions
without its lower level dependents. Together they make up "the"
system. In short I do not have "this" system which uses "that"
one.
My intent lies not in putting words into (or out of) Fare's mouth,
but to caution that not all readers come equally prepared. Thus
when we talk of such things as genericity, et al they are not
characteristics per se of the object, but controls that we have
imposed upon it. In meeting the Tunes HLL requirements then says
more about what "we" have to do in order for the "proper" mimicry
on the part of our product.